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The Substance Argument of Wittgenstein’sTractatusMichael Morris
In Morris (2008) I presented in outline a new interpretation
of the famous ‘substance argument’ in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus
(Wittgenstein 1922). The account I presented there gave a dis-
tinctive view of Wittgenstein’s main concerns in the argument,
but did not explain in detail how the argument works: how its
steps are to be found in the text, and how it concludes. I remain
convinced that the interpretation I proposed correctly identifies
themain concernswhich lie behind the argument. I return to the
argument here in order to elaborate in fuller detail the relation
between those concerns and the actual course of the text.
The Substance Argument of Wittgenstein’sTractatus
A Fixed-Form Interpretation
Michael Morris
1. Introduction
In Morris (2008) I presented in outline a new interpretation
of the famous ‘substance argument’ in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus
(Wittgenstein 1922). The account I presented there gave a dis-
tinctive view of Wittgenstein’s main concerns in the argument,
but did not explain in detail how the argument works: how its
steps are to be found in the text, and how it concludes. I remain
convinced that the interpretation I proposed correctly identifies
themain concernswhich lie behind the argument. I return to the
argument here in order to elaborate in fuller detail the relation
between those concerns and the actual course of the text.
For reasonswhichwill emerge shortly, I call any interpretation
which shares my view of the main concerns of the substance ar-
gument a fixed-form interpretation. My aim here is just to present
the idea of a fixed-form interpretation in enough detail for it to
be considered properly as a way of approaching this famously
puzzling piece of text: I will present the general motivation
for adopting a fixed-form interpretation; I will offer a detailed
breakdown of the argument as it might go on such an inter-
pretation; and I will provide a way of tying that breakdown of
the argument to the actual words of the text. I will also meet
a particular kind of interpretative objection which a fixed-form
interpretation is likely to face. But I will not consider in detail
any interpretation of the argument which has a radically dif-
ferent view of its main aim: I considered several of the more
prominent alternatives in the Appendix in Morris (2008), and
the objections I made there still seem to me to be good.
2. The Idea of a Fixed-Form Interpretation
The substance argument is presented in these two brief re-
marks:1
2.0211 If [A] the world had no substance, then [B] whether
a proposition had sense would depend on whether
another proposition was true.
2.0212 [C] It would then be impossible to form a picture of
the world (true or false).
I have here marked the three crucial sentences in this argument
[A], [B], and [C].
The key to the substance argument must be to understand
what the point of claiming that the world has substance might
be. This will also give us an understanding of sentence [A]. The
notion of substance is introduced in the first of a sequence of
remarks which are comments on 2.02. The key sequence here
consists of those comments on 2.02 which are given four-digit
remark numbers. (We need to recall here that sequences of
remarks are to be traced in line with Wittgenstein’s explanation
of his numbering system (Wittgenstein 1922, 31n), rather than
just by looking at what comes next in the printed text.) Here
they are, headed by 2.02 itself:
2.02 The object is simple.
2.021 Objects form the substance of theworld. Therefore they
cannot be compound. be, it must have something—a
form—in common with the real world.
1I continue to use here the Ogden translation.
Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy vol. 4 no. 7 [1]
2.022 It is clear that however different from the real one an
imagined world may
2.023 This fixed form consists of the objects.
2.024 Substance exists independently of what is the case.2
2.025 It is form and content.
2.026 Only if there are objects can there be a fixed form of the
world.
2.027 The fixed, the existent and the object are one.
When this sequence of remarks is laid out like this, I think it is
clear that the point of the notion of substance is bound up with
the following fixed-form claim:3
(FF) There must be a fixed form which is common to all
possible worlds.
And substance itself—what is formed by the objects—is brought
in because form is held to depend on objects (2.026); that might
be expressed in this claim:
(FO) There can only be a fixed form common to all possible
worlds if there are objects common to all possibleworlds.
(FO)—that is, 2.026—provides us with a reason, given (FF),
for believing 2.02, that objects are simple. The reason is that
2Kevin Mulligan has pointed out in conversation that ‘exist’ is a controver-
sial translation of ‘bestehen’ in this context.
3The notion of substance of course has an ancient history, tracing back
through various translations to Aristotle. Wittgenstein’s use is uniform with
Kant’s: in the First Analogy in Kant (1997), Kant effectively defines sub-
stance (‘der Substanz’, as in the Tractatus) as ‘that which persists’ (Kant 1997,
A182/B224), and the First Analogy is an argument that there must be such
a thing. Note that in the Tractatus, ‘substance’ is used as something like a
mass term, for something ‘formed by objects’; Wittgenstein does not speak of
substances.
compound objects would not be common to all possible worlds:
to think of something as compound is to make intelligible its
being uncompounded, leaving just its component parts, and
therefore to make intelligible worlds in which that compound
thing does not exist. Are we to suppose that 2.026 provides us
with a different reason for 2.02 from the one offered explicitly
in 2.021—that objects form the substance of the world? It seems
implausible: the natural interpretation is surely that the core
reason is just the same; it is only that it is put differently in the
different places.
If that is right, then the overall point of the larger passage to
which the substance argument belongs must be to argue for the
conjunction of (FF) and (FO), that there are objectswhich sustain
a fixed form common to all possible worlds. But we have seen
that (FO) is claimed in 2.026. So it is natural to think that the
point of the substance argument itself—the particular passage
consisting of 2.0211 and 2.0212—is just to argue for (FF). (I take
(FO) to depend on different considerations, and to need another
kind of justification.4)
An interpretation of the substance argument which takes it
to have this point is what I call a fixed-form interpretation. The
really hard challenge for any fixed-form interpretation is towork
out in detail how 2.0211 and 2.0212 could contain an argument
for (FF). I will turn to that in amoment, but first I will note that if
you understand the sequence of four-digit-numbered remarks
2.021–2.027 as revealing the point of the substance argument,
you will not think its point is given by a remark which precedes
the argument in the text:
4In Morris (2008, 48) I suggest that it can be traced back to problems with
Russell’s account of form; there is some counterpart to 2.026, expressed at the
level of language, at Wittgenstein (1979, 23):
The logical form of the proposition must already be given by the forms of
its component parts.
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2.0201 Every statement about complexes can be analysed
into a statement about their constituent parts, and
into those propositionswhich completely describe the
complexes.
If you understand the sequence of four-digit-numbered remarks
2.021–2.027 as I do, you will regard 2.0201 as a distraction from
the point of the substance argument—as indeed its number sug-
gests, given the principle of Wittgenstein’s numbering system.
What is the point of 2.0201, then? Surely just this: to explain
how ‘complexes’ can in a way be spoken of, even if what has just
been asserted in 2.02—that all objects are simple—is true, and
(as will turn out when we get on to the theory of language) all
names are names of objects. That is exactly what 2.0201 seems
to be doing anyway: 2.0201 is most naturally read, not as being
part of the argument which follows, but simply as explaining
how there can be expressions which look like names, but which
do not name simple objects. (There are, in any case, serious
difficulties with the obvious ways of trying to understand the
substance argument as one whose point is given by 2.0201, as I
argue in Morris 2008, Appendix.)
How then, can we understand 2.0211 and 2.0212 on a fixed-
form interpretation? A key remark here is the very next one
after our sequence of four-digit-numbered remarks:
2.0271 The object is the fixed, the existent; the configuration
is the changing, the variable.
In the context of this stretch of text, ‘fixed’ does not mean
constant across time; instead it means constant across possi-
ble worlds. Correspondingly, ‘changing’ and ‘variable’ do not
mean changing and variable in time, but changing and variable
across possible worlds. Objects are what is constant across all
possible worlds; possible worlds differ from one another only
in how those objects are configured. And of course, even if the
actual configurations of objects vary from world to world, the
possibilities of combination are written into the objects them-
selves:
2.0123 If I knowanobject, then I also knowall thepossibilities
of its occurrence in atomic facts.
(Every such possibility must lie in the nature of the
object.)
A new possibility cannot subsequently be found.
Indeed, this is the point of the notion of form, as Wittgenstein
uses it—as he explains immediately before claiming that objects
are simple:
2.0141 The possibility of its occurrence in atomic facts is the
form of the object.
Two things become clear from this. First, there is a point
which we might understand as the rationale for (FO) (that is,
2.026), given Wittgenstein’s understanding of form:
(PO) Every possibility is a possible combination of objects.
And secondly, it is clear that the fixed-form claim (FF) means
just this:
(NP) Every possibility is a necessary possibility.
That is, if something is possible, it is not contingent that it is
possible. (PO) and (NP) can be used to provide the basis of
a fixed-form interpretation of the substance argument and the
passage which surrounds it.
3. Interpreting the Key Propositions
There are three key propositions in the substance argument
proper. Reformulated to the present tense and the indicative,
they are:
[A] The world has no substance;
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[B] Whether a proposition has sense depends on whether
another proposition is true;
[C] It is impossible to form a picture of the world (true or
false).
The argument is supposed to work by reductio: [C] is absurd;
that shows [B] to be false; and that shows [A] to be false.
The fixed-form interpretation of the point of the substance
argument proper—the short passage consisting of 2.0211 and
2.0212—takes it to be designed to show that (NP) is true. So [A]
should be the negation of (NP). So let us take its core to be given
by this reformulation:
[A*] It is not the case that every possibility is a necessary
possibility.
That is: at least some possibilities are contingent possibilities—
they might not have been possible.
There is a remark inWittgenstein (1979, 14) which now seems
relevant:
A statement cannot be concerned with the logical structure of the
world, for in order for a statement to be possible at all, in order for
a proposition to be CAPABLE of making SENSE, the world must
already have just the logical structure that it has. The logic of the
world is prior to all truth and falsehood.
This looks as if it links something like the denial of [A] of
our argument—‘The logic of the world is prior to all truth and
falsehood’—with something like [C] of our argument—‘in order
for a statement to be possible at all’. What we need is to supply
the intermediate step—what [B] of our argument is supposed to
provide, according to the fixed-form interpretation.
If [B] is to have any bearing on the question whether some
possibilities are contingent, it must itself have something to do
with contingency. A simple reformulation then suggests itself:
[B†] Whether a proposition has sense is contingent upon
whether another proposition is true.5
There might be an immediate worry about this reformulation.
[B†] is meant to capture the meaning of [B], and [B] is some-
thingwhichWittgensteinwants to deny, in the course of arguing
against [A] by reductio. But we might think that [B†] was just
obviously true; and in particular, that it was just obvious that
propositions have sense only contingently. After all, it looks as
if it is contingent that any objects at all are assigned to a given
set of names as their meanings; and it looks (at least in advance
of the full working out of the Tractatus6) as if there could be a
proposition which stated that these objects have been assigned
to these names as their meanings.
The first thing to note is that if this worry were genuine, its
central core would apply equally to the original [B]: an assign-
ment of objects to names does have to be made, and it looks—at
first sight, at least—as if such an assignment can always be de-
scribed. In the light of that, I suggest that ‘has sense’ here is
given a slightly unusual, restricted interpretation: having sense
should be taken to be being syntactically possible, so that a propo-
sition’s having sense is its being a possible combination of sym-
bols. Although this understanding of ‘sense’ (German ‘Sinn’) is
eccentric—and eccentric, of course, in the Tractatus as much as
elsewhere—it may be justified by somethingWittgenstein wrote
to Ogden about the translation of 3.326 (Wittgenstein 1973, 59).
5One of the chief defects of the presentation in Morris (2008) was that I
did not make clear there that this is how I was understanding sentence [B]
of the argument. Both Richard Gaskin and Leo Cheung made the otherwise
reasonable assumption that (1) in the text was an instance of [B]. Kevin Mul-
ligan has questioned whether [B†] really introduces the issue of contingency
more obviously than [B] itself does. This is largely an issue of the natural ways
of reading [B] and [B†]: I here stipulate that [B†] is to be read as explicitly
involving the issue of contingency, whether or not [B] does.
6And in fact, I think, anyway: I do not myself think that specific statements
of which objects are assigned to which names are ruled out in the Tractatus.
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Here is the remark itself, in Ogden’s translation:
3.326 In order to recognize the symbol in the sign we must
consider the significant [sinnvollen] use.
And here is Wittgenstein’s comment to Ogden:
I think ‘significant’ is alright here. The meaning of this prop is:
that in order to recognize the symbol in the sign we must look at
how this sign is used significantly in propositions. I.e., we must
observe how the sign is used in accordance with the laws of logical
syntax. Thus ‘significant’ here means as much as ‘syntactically
correct’.
That is exactly how I suggestweunderstand the notion of having
sense in 2.0211. It is clear that on Wittgenstein’s view a propo-
sition can have sense, on this understanding of ‘sense’, even if
no meaning has been assigned to its constituent names. This is
how Wittgenstein insists that we should understand the rogue
proposition ‘Socrates is identical’, in 5.4733:
“Socrates is identical” means nothing because there is no property
which is called “identical”. The proposition is senseless because
we have not made some arbitrary determination, not because the
symbol is in itself impermissible.7
Of course, here in 5.4733, as elsewhere in the Tractatus, Wittgen-
stein uses ‘sense’ (‘Sinn’) itself and its cognates in such a way
that having sense is a matter of objects being assigned to names,
and ‘sense’ does not here have the narrow syntactical meaning
which I am suggesting it has in 2.0211. But this is not in itself an
argument against interpreting ‘sense’ in that narrow syntactical
way in 2.0211, since, as we have seen, Wittgenstein himself in-
terprets the term in just that narrow way in his understanding
of 3.326.8
7Of course, the translation of ‘unsinnig’ as senseless here is famously con-
troversial. Nothing in my argument depends on the point, however.
8I think it is in general a mistake to think of Wittgenstein as using words
If we understand having sense in 2.0211 in the way suggested,
andaccept that aproposition canhave sense, on this understand-
ing of the notion, even when meaning has not been assigned to
its constituent names, the obvious worry about [B†] lapses: it is
not just obvious that propositions have sense contingently. Even
so, the exact implications of the idea of one proposition’s sense
being contingent upon another proposition’s truth are not easy to
spell out. It looks plausible to reformulate [B†] as involving a
conjunctive condition, as follows:
[B*] A proposition P is such that (i) P has sense only if an-
other proposition is true; and (ii) that other proposition
is contingent.
The importance of both conjuncts of [B*] is worth emphasizing.
Some might be tempted to read [B] (‘Whether a proposition
has sense depends on whether another proposition is true’) as
meaning no more than is expressed by (i), the first conjunct of
[B*], but this would break the connection between the argument
and issues of contingency, and sowouldprevent [B] contributing
to an argument of the kind which the fixed-form interpretation
finds in 2.0211–2.0212.9 One more point about the formulation
of [B*] should be noted: strictly speaking, it can be read either
as a universal generalization (‘Every proposition P’) or as an
existential generalization (‘SomepropositionP’). The ambiguity
is more explicit in [B*] than in [B] itself, but it can be read in
in the Tractatus as if they were technical terms, always with the same clearly
defined meaning: I think this ignores the literary and pedagogical character
of the work. But that is a larger issue than can be pursued here.
9I emphasize this point here, because it was not emphasized enough in
Morris (2008). Some have assumed, in effect, that the first conjunct, (i), of [B*]
on its own would express what is meant by [B]. Applying this assumption to
the interpretation of the argument presented in Morris (2008) quickly makes
a nonsense of that interpretation. I hope that once it is clear that I take [B] to
be captured by the whole of [B*], and not just by its first conjunct, people will
not dismiss the interpretation so quickly.
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[B] too. (I suspect Wittgenstein would have thought that if the
existential generalizationwere true, the universal generalization
would be true too: that is, all propositions are alike in this
respect.) I have left the ambiguity in the formulation, but what
the argument needs is the existential form: [B*] is a spelling out
of the consequences of [A]; since [A] is itself the negation of a
universal generalization, it is itself equivalent to an existential
generalization. I will therefore be treating [B*] as an existential
generalization from now on.
So much for the understanding we need of [A] and [B] for
a fixed-form interpretation of the argument. Finally, we might
consider the unusual formof [C] of our argument. It differs from
the formulation in theNotebooks passage I have quoted precisely
in introducing the notion of a picture, a Bild. The picture theory
has not yet been stated at this point in the Tractatus, but just
as the whole shape of the metaphysics of the 1s and early 2s is
determined by the picture theory, so it is natural to take the use
of the notion of a picture in 2.0212 as an anticipatory reference
to that theory: indeed, there is no other explanation of the intro-
duction of the notion of a picture here. We should then expect
the argument for point [C] to make essential use of the picture
theory, and it will be a desideratum of any interpretation that it
represents the argument as doing that.10
4. The Core of the Argument
Bearing all that in mind, we can offer the beginning of a recon-
struction of a line of argument which looks broadly Wittgen-
steinian in spirit, andwhich promises to get us to (NP) bymeans
of a reductio which is at least close to what we find in 2.0211–
2.0212.
10I noted inMorris (2008) that a number of alternative interpretations of the
substance argument fail to meet this desideratum.
For [A*] we need to imagine a possibility which might be
thought to be only contingently possible. (PO) tells us that
this will be a possible combination of objects. Let us choose
one, arbitrarily—abcde. According to the picture theory of the
Tractatus, this is justwhatmight be representedby an elementary
sentence. Sowe canwrite it downusing an elementary sentence:
(P1) abcde.
The picture theory of the Tractatus requires two things to be true
for an elementary sentence to have sense (in the ordinary sense
of ‘sense’, rather than the restricted notion I am reading into
2.0211):
(a) Its elements (names) must be correlated with objects;
(b) It must be possible for the objects correlated with the ele-
ments of the sentence to be combined in the same way as
the elements of the sentence are combined.
Of these two conditions, it is (b) that particularly concerns us
here, since it is this which is relevant to the issue of whether
the symbols in a sentence form a syntactically possible combi-
nation. (Indeed, given the waywe are understanding the notion
of sense which is relevant to the argument of 2.0211–2.0212, the
importance of (a) is just that it takes us to a particular, arbitrarily
chosen, combinatorial possibility in reality.)
Both condition (a) and condition (b) were presumed to be met
when we set up our example and wrote down the sentence (P1).
And if they were met, then this sentence must be true:
(P2) It is possible that abcde.
But that commitment of the picture theory I have just formulated
as requiring (b) to be true seems to require this to be true:
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(1) (P1) has sense only if (P2) is true.11
Recall that on the interpretation of ‘has sense’ whichwe adopted
in the last section, (1)means: (P1) is a syntactically possible com-
bination of symbols only if (P2) is true. That is to say, ‘abcde’ is a
possible combination of symbols only if the correlative combi-
nation of objects, that abcde, is a possible combination of objects.
Of course, that that abcde is the correlative combination of ob-
jects requires (P1) to have sense in something like the ordinary
interpretation of ‘sense’. But given that that abcde is the correla-
tive combination of objects, (1) is still true even if ‘has sense’ is
interpreted in the narrowly syntactic way. And that (1) is true
on this narrow syntactic interpretation seems an immediate con-
sequence of the core assumption of the picture theory, that the
form of language is the same as the form of reality—or, in other
words, that the possible combinations of names are the same as
the possible combinations of objects.
In order to test [A*] (‘It is not the case that every possibility is
a necessary possibility’), we needed an example of a possibility
thatwemight take to be a contingent possibility, andwe arbitrar-
ily chose the possibility represented in (P1) for that purpose. So
suppose, for reductio, that that possibility is indeed a contingent
possibility. That means that this is true:
(2) (P2) is contingent.
If we put (1) and (2) together, we get this:
[B*i] (1) (P1) has sense only if (P2) is true; and (2) (P2) is
contingent.
And [B*i], of course, is an instance of [B*]. That is, we have
found a proposition—(P1)—whose having sense is contingent
upon whether another proposition—(P2)—is true, on the inter-
11Note that I do not take (1) to be an expression of (an instance of) [B] in
2.0211. It is rather an expression just of [B*i] (1).
pretation of ‘contingent upon’ which is enshrined in [B*]. (And,
of course, this in turn was the interpretation of ‘depends on’ in
[B] which is needed for a fixed-form interpretation of the whole
argument.)
If that is right, we have here a line of reasoningwhich explains
the link between [A*] and [B*], and hence—assuming that the
fixed-form interpretation is broadly right—the link between [A]
and [B]. On supposing some possibility to be contingent, we
have been led to a sentence whose having sense is contingent
upon another sentence’s being true. That is, we have explained
howWittgenstein might, on the basis of the picture theory, have
written 2.0211.
And we can nowmake at least the first move in showing how
[B*i] itself might be seen to be problematic, if we accept the
picture theory. The picture theory commits us to (1), and two
further considerations of a generally Wittgensteinian character
imply that if (1) is true, (P2) cannot be contingent. The first fur-
ther consideration is a reflection on the semantics of embedded
sentences. If we actually look at (P2) we see that the sentence
‘abcde’ occurs within it—and in its own right, and not merely
quoted. So it seems clear that (P2) cannot have sense if this in-
tegral part of it has no sense. That is, it seems we have to accept
this:
(3) (P2) has sense only if (P1) has sense.
The reasoning here is exactly in line with the objection Wittgen-
stein makes to Russell’s theory of judgement:
5.5422 The correct explanation of the form of the proposition
“A judges p” must show that it is impossible to judge
a nonsense. (Russell’s theory does not satisfy this
condition.)
But from (1) and (3), we can derive this:
(4) (P2) has sense only if (P2) is true.
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At this point the second further consideration comes into play.
This is the following plausible-seeming principle about contin-
gency:
(CP) If a sentence is contingent, it cannot only have sense if it
is true.
(CP) is, in fact, questionable. There is an obvious class of a
priori truthswhich consists of sentenceswhich cannot have sense
without being true;12 it is therefore natural to think that (CP) is
only plausible if there cannot be contingent a priori truths—
something we now generally doubt. But it used to be widely
accepted that there cannot be contingent a priori truths, and
there is some reason to think that Wittgenstein himself accepted
that at the time of the Tractatus. Of course, if we accept (CP),
then it follows from (4) that (P2) cannot be contingent. Since the
possibility in question—that abcde—was arbitrarily chosen, this
means that no possibility can be a contingent possibility. And
that, of course, is what we wanted to show, according to the
fixed-form interpretation.
5. The Conclusion of the Argument
What we have, then, is a line of argument which takes us from
Wittgensteinian premises to the conclusion that no possibility
can be a contingent possibility. (This is, in effect, an expanded
12It is arguable that there are sentences which are not a prioriwhich can only
have sense if they are true. Suppose we think (i) that proper names only have
sense if their referents exist, and (ii) that some proper names refer to things
whose existence we cannot know a priori. If we accept both (i) and (ii), and
‘N’ is a proper name of the relevant kind, then we will have to accept that ‘N
exists’ is a sentence which can only have sense if it is true, but will not be a
priori. This does not affect the point of the text, however, since the obvious
examples of sentences which can only have sense if they are true are a priori,
and it is in any case unclear that Wittgenstein would have accepted both (i)
and (ii). (I am grateful to Corine Besson for raising this issue.)
and clarifiedversionofwhat is to be found inMorris 2008.) What
is not so clear (what was left unclear in Morris 2008) is exactly
how this relates to the text of 2.0211–2.0212. In particular, it is
not clear exactly how it is that the reductio is turned by means of
this claim:
[C] It is impossible to form a picture of the world (true or
false).
To begin with, it may be helpful to summarize the key points
of the last section. What we found there is that the following
claims form an inconsistent set:
(1) (P1) has sense only if (P2) is true.
(2) (P2) is contingent.
(3) (P2) has sense only if (P1) has sense.
(CP) If a sentence is contingent, it cannot only have sense if it
is true.
(1) follows from the picture theory. (3) and (CP) follow from
considerations which it is independently plausible to attribute
toWittgenstein. (2) is, in effect, an arbitrarily chosen instance of:
[A*] It is not the case that every possibility is a necessary
possibility,
since [A*] is equivalent to:
[A**] At least one possibility is a contingent possibility.
In the spirit of the fixed-form interpretation which the sur-
rounding text strongly suggests, [A*]—that is, in effect, [A**]—is
the heart of this key proposition:
[A] The world has no substance.
(1) and (2) together form an instance of:
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[B*] A proposition P is such that (i) if P has sense only if an-
other proposition is true; and (ii) that other proposition
is contingent.
And this is the fixed-form interpretation’s version of this key
proposition:
[B] Whether a proposition has sense depends on whether
another proposition is true.
(2) is what needs to be rejected in the reductio.
To bring [C] to bear on this, we need to hold (3) and (CP) con-
stant and beyond question, as things which follow from quite
general considerations to which Wittgenstein seems to be com-
mitted. Given that (1), (2), (3), and (CP) form an inconsistent set,
this means that we can only accept (2) if we reject (1). But (1)
follows straightforwardly from the picture theory, so rejecting
(1) means rejecting the picture theory. What we need to do is
make that fact the core of the problem which [C] raises. The
simplest thing would just be to take [C] as pointing out that the
hypothesis that some possibilities are contingent possibilities is
incompatible with the picture theory. This would make [C], in
effect, equivalent to this:
[C*1] The picture theory is false.
And that would mean that what is taken to be obviously ob-
jectionable in [C] is not—or not directly—the impossibility of
saying anything, but the rejection of the picture theory.
That seems to me not a very plausible reading of [C], but
we can take the same materials in a different way to give us
something which fits the text better. Understanding [C] as [C*1]
involves recognizing that, with background assumptions held
constant, the idea that some possibilities are contingent is in-
compatible with the picture theory, and deciding in favour of
the picture theory. We might see this as setting one philosoph-
ical theory against another, and that might seem to give us a
rather weak way of rejecting the idea of contingent possibili-
ties. But things would only seem this way to Wittgenstein if
he thought of the picture theory as we think of it—as a theory.
But what if he did not think of it as a theory at all? What if he
did not think of it as just one explanation among others of the
possibility of representing the world, but the obvious necessary
truth of what is required for representation? In that case, bear-
ing in mind that ‘abcde’ was chosen quite arbitrarily, he will be
committed to this:
(P) If sentences are to be capable of picturing reality at all,
then (1) is true.
Against this background, the rejection of (1) would lead us to
deny that sentences can picture reality at all. And that would
then be precisely what is claimed by [C]. In effect, [C] would
mean this:
[C*2] It is impossible for sentences to picture reality at all.
And that really does seem close to what [C] actually says.
Moreover, I think it is clear that Wittgenstein did not think of
the picture theory as a theory. At least, it seems clear that he
did not think of his conception of pictures—Bilder—as a theory:
he seems to have thought that it was obvious that this is how
pictures or models work; if he thought the Tractatus involved a
theory at all, the theory was just that sentences work in the way
that pictures or models obviously work.
6. A Challenge
Here is the position, then. By adopting the general approach of a
fixed-form interpretation, we are able to make reasonable sense
of the link between [A] and [B], and therefore of 2.0211. And
we have just seen how [C] can be understood, within a fixed-
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form interpretation, as providing the decisive step for a reductio.
What I want to look at now is a worry that people might have
about the argument I have, in effect, attributed to Wittgenstein.
The worry is that some of the moves which have to be at-
tributed to Wittgenstein on any fixed-form interpretation are
likely to seem out of character with Wittgenstein, as he appears
in the Tractatus. Chief among these will be this step which was
key to the working out of the core of the argument:
(1) (P1) has sense only if (P2) is true.
The problem is that it maywell seemwholly un-Wittgensteinian
to count (P2)—‘It is possible that abcde’—as a proposition which
might be true.13 But any fixed-form interpretation is likely to
have to do something like that.
I think the worry seems particularly pressing here because
one difficulty—that of (P2) being a proposition which might be
true—is taken out of context. So let us put it into context: this
will enable us to turn the worry into a precise challenge to my
interpretation, which we can then deal with.
The difficulty over (P2) arises from the fact that it seems to say
something about possibility, and it seems to be the view of the
Tractatus that there can be no true propositions about possibility.
(Whether this is all or merely part of the difficulty with the idea
of philosophical propositions is something which can be set
on one side here.) As we have seen, Wittgenstein thinks of
possibility and necessity in terms of form, so the problem with
the idea of true propositions about possibility can be traced back
to the difficulty of saying anything about form.
The difficulty is presented in its most general version, for the
case of pictures or models in general, in the following passage:
13This point has been made both by Michael Potter in his (2009), and by
Leo Cheung in correspondence. It was also pressed by José Zalabardo at the
workshop in Fribourg at which I presented an earlier version of this paper.
2.172 The picture, however, cannot depict its form of depic-
tion; it shows it forth.
2.173 The picture presents its object from without (its stand-
point is its formof representation), therefore thepicture
presents its object rightly or falsely.
2.174 But the picture cannot place itself outside of its form of
representation.
This passage contains hints towards an argument for the con-
clusion that no picture can depict its own form.14 The same
argument is then applied to the case of propositions in the fol-
lowing passage:
4.12 Propositions can represent the whole reality, but they
cannot represent what they must have in common with
reality in order to be able to represent it—the logical
form.
To be able to represent the logical form, we should have
to be able to put ourselves with the propositions outside
logic, that is outside the world.
The key to the argument, in both the general and the partic-
ular version, is the idea of a picture occupying a place ‘outside’
what it represents. I have suggested (Morris 2008, 133) thatwhat
it is for a picture to occupy a place ‘outside’ what it represents
is for its being a picture to be independent of whether it repre-
sents things correctly or incorrectly. This means that it cannot
represent its own form, and also, because pictures have to have
the same form as any reality they can represent, that it cannot
represent the form of reality. It follows from this that there can
be no such picture as this:
(P2) It is possible that abcde.
14I offer an account of this argument in Morris (2008, 131–35).
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According to the account I have offered, however, the picture
theory of language is committed to this:
(1) (P1) has sense only if (P2) is true.
And (P1) was just an arbitrarily chosen elementary proposition
(‘abcde’). So it looks as if the picture theory will not be able to
allow that any elementary proposition has sense.
What we see from this is that, given the background assump-
tions which I have claimed are in play here, there is a tension
between the following two claims:
(X) Some elementary propositions have sense; and
(Y) There can be no such picture as (P2).15
Wittgenstein is clearly committed to (X); and we have just seen
that he is committed to (Y). So the suggestion is that if it follows
from the commitments which I attribute to Wittgenstein that
(X) and (Y) are in tension, I must be wrong in attributing those
commitments to Wittgenstein.
I think this argument depends on a kind of selective delay
in implementing the consequences of Wittgenstein’s views. (Y)
seems to be in tension with (X), because if we accept both (Y)
and (1)—‘(P1) has sense only if (P2) is true’—it seems that we
have to give up (X). That is, if we accept that both (Y) and (1) are
true, we have to give up (X). But look again at (1). Its first clause
is this:
(1a) (P1) has sense.
And as I have insisted, ‘has sense’ here means is syntactically
possible. But that means that (1a) is about form in exactly the
same way as (P2) is. In the case of (1a) it is the form of a
15I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this journal for suggesting this
tension as a way of bringing out what seems problematic about the idea that
(P2) could be a proposition which might be true.
proposition, while in the case of (P2) it is the form of reality; but
of course it is the central claim of the picture theory that it is the
same form in both cases.
What that means is that any argument which shows that there
can be no such picture as (P2) must also show that there can be
no such picture as (1a). If there can be no such picture as (1a),
it is hard to see how (1) as a whole can be true. So it looks as if
the very considerations which lead us to think—(Y)—that (P2)
cannot be a proposition which might be true ought also to lead
us to think that (1) cannot be a proposition which might be true.
It is hard then to see how we can coherently insist that both
(Y) and (1) are true. So it is hard to see how a challenge to the
proposed interpretation can be made on this score.
Of course, once one begins to pull on this thread, the whole
thing unravels. If (P2) and (1a) are both about form, then so
surely is (X). And then, given that (Y) too is modal, so surely is
(Y)—and the argument for (Y) explicitly concerns form anyway.
Does this itself perhaps threaten the interpretation I have offered
here?
I think not, but it is clear that some quite general issues about
the interpretation of the Tractatus are in play here. It is famously
an important claim of the work that the sentences within it are
nonsense (Wittgenstein 1922, 6.54). This leads obviously to the
question of how closely we should look at those sentences—at
least the sentences other than those which claim that the sen-
tences of thework are nonsense. A certain style of interpretation
seems to encourage us not to look closely at them at all.16 I take
a different view: I think the work as a whole presents itself as
having a broadly coherent rational structure—at least until its
central claims are applied to itself. Part of that sense of the
rationality of the work derives, I think, from the fact that ar-
guments are hinted at all through the text. Our key passage,
16This seems to be where the ‘new’ or ‘resolute’ reading of the Tractatus
leads: see, e.g., Diamond (1991) and Conant (2000).
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2.0211–2.0212, clearly hints at an argument. We have just seen
another argument hinted at in 2.172–2.174, and again at 4.12.
It is striking, though, that there are really only hints of argu-
ments in the text. There are two quite mundane explanations of
that. First, I suspect that Wittgenstein did not himself work ar-
guments out very carefully or very explicitly—largely because
he did not feel he needed to: it seemed to him that he could
just see how certain propositions fitted together. (The story of
Russell’s bewilderment at Wittgenstein’s argument against his
theory of judgement is a good illustration of the different charac-
ter of these two minds.17) And secondly—no doubt encouraged
by the first thing—he seems to have been impatient about ex-
plicit argument, almost as if he regarded the explicit laying out
of a proof as vulgar.
But there is perhaps a deeper explanation, which is more at-
tractive both from a philosophical and from a literary point of
view. If we attempt to develop the hints which Wittgenstein of-
fers into explicit arguments, we find ourselves laying out claims
like (1), (2), (3), and (4)—and, of course, (P2)—which have a
bluntness which feels almost crude. One thing this does is
make it very difficult to resist applying the conclusions of the
Tractatus to itself—and so finding it odd to be claiming, for ex-
ample, that (P2) is a propositionwhichmight be true. Ifwe press
that, then, as we have just seen, it looks as if the whole thing
unravels. In the end, this is not obviously a bad thing, on the
text’s own terms. In the end, as we know, Wittgenstein claims,
‘he who understands me finally recognizes [my propositions]
as senseless’ (Wittgenstein 1922, 6.54). But perhaps it is impor-
tant that we should not reach that point too quickly: perhaps
we are supposed to get there only when we have ‘climbed out
through them, on them, over them’. So there is another reason
whyWittgenstein might at least have been content to leave only
17See Russell’s letter to Ottoline Morrell of 27 May 1913, quoted in Monk
(1996, 297).
hints of arguments in the text: while there are just hints, we
have the sense of doing philosophy, and of there being a whole
theory which makes sense of everything; but when we develop
those hints into something explicit, the theory unravels and we
are left with no meaningful propositions at all.
What this means is that we can acknowledge that any making
explicit of the arguments of the Tractatuswill give us something
which is un-Wittgensteinian in character. But that does not
mean that we should give up all attempts to develop the hints
into explicit argument: rather, developing the hints into explicit
argument seems to be just what we should do, if we are to see
how the whole work unravels in the way Wittgenstein seems to
have thought it did. Thatmeans that it is no immediate objection
to any particular interpretation of a stretch of argument that it
presents us with something which feels un-Wittgensteinian in
the kind of way the interpretation offered here does. As for
the interpretation itself, whatever one thinks about the detailed
account of the working out of the conclusion of the argument on
the fixed-form interpretationwhich I have offered here, it strikes
me that the sequence of four-digit-numbered remarks from2.021
to 2.027 constitutes a very compelling case for thinking that some
version of the fixed-form interpretation must be right.
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